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WHY THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT SHOULD BE
REPEALED
ALEX LIPOW*

INTRODUCTION
The Congressional Review Act (“CRA”) is a procedure that allows
the political branches to quickly repeal certain regulations promulgated by
administrative agencies without going through the arduous rule-making
process traditionally required.1 Although it had been successfully used only
once before 2017, President Trump and Republicans in Congress used the
CRA to repeal sixteen regulations in 2017 and 20182 while President Biden
and Democrats in Congress used the CRA three times in 2021.3 Because
the CRA has been used rarely,4 and its central provisions are barely adjudicated in the judiciary, there are interesting legal questions about how
expansively the law may be used.5
Whatever the legal uncertainties, the CRA degrades the federal
regulatory system generally, and it has undermined environmental regulatory governance in particular. Using environmental regulation as a prism,
this Note argues that Congress should repeal the CRA. If framed properly,
repealing the CRA could be seen as supporting the interests of both environmentalists and business interests as the nation confronts climate
change. In that vein, Part I of this Note provides a background of the CRA,
including its mechanics and history. Part II of this Note argues that the
*
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1
5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08.
2
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43992, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 6 (2020).
3
Rachel Frazin, Biden Nixes Trump Rules on Methane Emissions, Lending, Employment
Discrimination, THE HILL (June 30, 2021, 5:54 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/admin
istration/560991-biden-nixes-trump-rules-on-methane-emissions-lending-employment
[https://perma.cc/ZZ47-SHHZ].
4
Id.; CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 3.
5
See, e.g., Kevin Chen, Why Congress Should Repeal the Congressional Review Act, HARV.
ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (Apr. 23, 2020), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2020/04/why
-congress-should-repeal-the-congressional-review-act/ [https://perma.cc/4KBJ-57CR];
Sarah Douglas, Tugaw Ranches, LLC v. U.S. Department of the Interior: New Scrutiny of
the Congressional Review Act in A Changing Political Landscape, 44 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
299, 320 (2020).
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CRA should be repealed for three main reasons. First, the CRA was poorly
drafted6 and its future use will likely cause negative unintended consequences on the environment that may well take years to manifest. Environmentalists have better tools at their disposal to achieve their regulatory
goals.7 Additionally, this Note argues that the CRA creates uncertainty for
stakeholders, including both environmentalists and corporate interests,
while simultaneously making it difficult for any administration to create
long-term impactful policies to address controversial issues.8 Finally, the
CRA has the potential to artificially stymie future legislation,9 specifically
impairing support for environmental bills.10
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CRA

A.

Overview of the CRA’s Mechanics

The CRA is a procedure that allows the political branches to quickly
repeal certain regulations promulgated by administrative agencies without
going through the arduous rule-making process traditionally required by
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).11 Under the CRA, agencies
must submit certain newly promulgated regulations to Congress.12 Then,
both chambers of Congress have sixty legislative days to pass resolutions
“disapproving” the regulations.13 Such disapproval resolutions affect regulations in their entirety—it is not possible for Congress to use the CRA
to remove specific regulatory provisions.14 Simple majorities in both
6
See, e.g., § 801(b)(2) (failing to provide a definition of “substantially the same form”);
§ 805 (declaring vaguely that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under this
chapter shall be subject to judicial review.”).
7
See, e.g., Oliver Milman, ‘Sloppy and Careless’: Courts Call Out Trump Blitzkrieg on
Environmental Rules, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 20, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian
.com/environment/2018/feb/20/donald-trump-epa-environmental-rollbacks-court-chal
lenges [https://perma.cc/A2PE-MKMA].
8
See Bethany Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Rollbacks Have Changed the
Nature of Presidential Power, REGUL. REV. (Mar. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Noll & Revesz
(2020)], https://www.theregreview.org/2020/03/16/davis-noll-revesz-regulatory-rollbacks
-changed-nature-presidential-power/ [https://perma.cc/9ZDM-TUY5]; see generally Bethany
A. Davis Noll & Richard L. Revesz, Regulation in Transition, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2019)
[hereinafter Noll & Revesz (2019)].
9
Noll & Revesz (2019), supra note 8, at 8.
10
Id. at 3.
11
See §§ 801–08.
12
§ 801(a); CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 6–11.
13
§ 801(a)(3), (d).
14
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 5.
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chambers are sufficient to pass such disapproval resolutions.15 The disapproval resolutions are not subject to the filibuster and only require a
maximum ten hours of floor debate time in the Senate.16
If the President signs the disapproval resolution or if Congress
overrides a Presidential veto, the disapproved regulation cannot take
effect.17 And perhaps even more importantly, the executive branch cannot
reissue regulations that are “substantially the same” as the disapproved
regulation, unless it is “specifically authorized” by a later-enacted law.18
Although this legislative process is relatively straightforward, there
is scant case law related to the CRA19 and it is far from clear how the
courts would interpret many of the CRA’s provisions.20 Namely, as indicated above, whenever the CRA is used, federal agencies lose the authority
to reissue regulations “substantially the same” to the rule repealed.21 It is
unclear what “substantially the same” means in practice.22 For instance,
what would happen if the CRA is used to repeal a regulation designed to
reduce lead in drinking water? Is the federal government restricted from
regulating anything related to drinking water or lead? Or should the interpretation be narrower?
These questions have not been thoroughly tested in court.23
However, as aptly written in the Colorado Natural Resources, Energy &
Environmental Law Review, if a federal agency is in a position to regulate
an issue related to a rule struck down by the CRA, there are two approaches the agency might take:
First, it could try to change the rule, such that it is no
longer “substantially the same.” . . . But an agency would
have no way of knowing where the line between “different,
but not substantially different” and “permissibly different”
might lie. Overhauling the rule in an attempt to find that
15

Id. at 15.
Scott A. Sinder et al., Post-Election Considerations: The Congressional Review Act,
STEPTOE (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.steptoe.com/en/news-publications/post-election-con
siderations-the-congressional-review-act.html [https://perma.cc/CP6P-ZZAG].
17
§ 801(a)(3)(B), (c).
18
§ 801(b).
19
See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
20
For a sample of the discourse debating how courts should interpret the CRA, see Chen,
supra note 5, at 3–6; Douglas, supra note 5, at 319–20; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening
the Congressional Review Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 218 (2018).
21
Chen, supra note 5, at 1.
22
Id.
23
See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
16
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line might undermine the very purposes it had for passing
the rule in the first place. Second, if an agency wants to
try a more surgical approach and get Congress to authorize an updated yet substantially similar rule, the agency
could try to identify the part of the rule Congress most
strongly disapproved of . . . But without guidance from
Congress as to which part of the rule it wants changed,
this approach feels more like a game of Marco Polo than
reasoned rulemaking.24
And even under these less-than-optimal scenarios, parties opposed to the
rules would almost certainly bring suit based on the ambiguity.
Additionally, the CRA contains a provision excluding at least part
of itself from judicial review.25 The language is far from clear,26 and commentators and lower courts are not certain if it limits judicial review to
a particular portion of the CRA or the entire law.27 Although it seems
rather unlikely that appellate courts will interpret the language to limit
the scrutiny of the entire CRA,28 the contours of such a limitation could
have a profound effect on the administrative state.
Finally, it is important to note that there are disagreements about
what type of executive actions fall under the CRA’s purview.29 What beyond major regulations is included? Do guidance documents or Presidential
memoranda apply? There are different interpretations.30 While important, these questions do not fall under the scope of this Note because,
regardless of how courts answer, the other substantive issues raised by
the CRA will continue to effect major environmental rules.
B.

Legislative History of the Congressional Review Act

Because there is scant case law related to the use of the CRA,31
courts might look to the legislative history of the CRA itself to adjudicate
24

Eric Dude, The Conflicting Mandate: Agency Paralysis Through the Congressional Review
Act’s Resubmit Provision, 30 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 115, 121–22 (2019).
25
§ 805 (declaring vaguely that “[n]o determination, finding, action, or omission under
this chapter shall be subject to judicial review.”).
26
Id.
27
See Chen, supra note 5, at 5.
28
Id. at 5–6.
29
Id. at 7.
30
Id. at 2.
31
See infra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
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future disputes that might stem from the CRA’s use.32 It is therefore important to note that Congress initially passed the CRA after the Supreme
Court, in 1983, held that the legislative veto—a once popular provision that
allowed Congress to block executive branch decisions without involving the
President33—unconstitutionally infringed upon the President’s enumerated powers.34 More than a decade after the Court decision, Congress
concocted the CRA as “a lawmaking procedure that would approximate
a legislative veto as closely as [the Supreme Court] would allow.”35 However, to ensure the Court did not strike down the CRA as unconstitutional,
Congress gave the President veto power over disapproval resolutions
passed under the CRA.36
But while the goal of the CRA is clear, Congress provided few formal
legislative details as it passed it.37 Indeed, the CRA actually passed as a
provision in the larger Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
Act of 1996.38 The legislation’s passage was so unceremonious that the
Senate passed it by unanimous consent,39 a procedure that allowed the
chamber to pass the legislation without holding a full vote with all senators present.40
Realizing the potential problems caused by failing to provide legislative history,41 weeks after the CRA had been signed into law the primary
sponsors of the legislation submitted into the Congressional Record a
statement that they hoped would “provide a detailed explanation and a
legislative history” of the CRA and give “guidance to the agencies, the
courts, and other interested parties when interpreting the [CRA’s] terms.”42
It is unclear how courts might weight this statement as it only reflects
the views of a handful of Members of Congress (albeit the most important sponsors of the legislation) after the CRA had become law.43 And
32

See Chen, supra note 5, at 3.
GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 168 (8th ed. 2019).
34
Id. at 168–77.
35
Larkin, supra note 20, at 197.
36
Id.
37
Kevin Chen, The Congressional Review Act’s Legal Uncertainties, HARV. ENV’T & ENERGY L. PROGRAM (2020), https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2020/05/the-congressional-review
-acts-legal-uncertainties [https://perma.cc/4ZGM-AXDY].
38
Chen, supra note 5, at 2.
39
Id.
40
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20668, HOW MEASURES ARE BROUGHT TO THE SENATE FLOOR: A
BRIEF INTRODUCTION, 1 (2019).
41
See Chen, supra note 37.
42
142 CONG. REC. 8196–97 (1996).
43
See Chen, supra note 5, at 3.
33
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even if a court does find the statement persuasive, the statement does
not provide a clearer understanding of what regulations are “substantially the same” under the CRA.44 However, the statement does clarify
that the sponsors viewed that “the limitation on judicial review [of the
CRA] in no way prohibits a court from determining whether a rule is in
effect.”45 The sponsors also opined that “[in] deciding cases or controversies [involving the CRA] properly before it, a court or agency must give
effect to the intent of the Congress when such a resolution is enacted and
becomes the law of the land.”46 In the end, one thing is clear based on
this history: when courts adjudicate cases involving the CRA, they have
much to consider.
C.

The Historical Role of the CRA

Before 2017, the CRA had only been used successfully once.47 However, things changed when President Trump took office and the Republicans took full control of the federal legislative and executive branches in
2017.48 In the time Republicans retained unified control of Washington,
they used the CRA to repeal sixteen regulations promulgated toward the
end of the Obama administration.49 These regulations touched a wide variety of issues,50 including a rule designed to prevent coal mining pollution
from entering rivers and streams and another rule amending regulations
for National Wildlife Refuges in Alaska.51 Four years later, President
Biden and Democrats in Congress used the CRA to repeal three regulations, including a rule affecting how the federal government controls
Methane emissions.52
To date, there has not been a significant decision from an appellate court affecting the substance of the CRA.53 However, a few judges
have reached different conclusions about the justiciability of the CRA.54
Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska dismissed
44

See 142 CONG. REC. 8199.
Id.
46
Id.
47
CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 2, at 6, 25–26.
48
See id. at 6.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 25–26.
51
Id.
52
Frazin, supra note 3.
53
Chen, supra note 5, at 5–6.
54
Douglas, supra note 5, at 301.
45
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a lawsuit that argued that the CRA unconstitutionally delegated executive authority.55
The lack of case law is not surprising given how rarely the CRA has
been used.56 Indeed, given the political realities, “there is virtually no
chance that the President would sign a resolution of disapproval” eliminating regulations his own administration promulgated, “or that a two
thirds majority could be assembled in each House to overturn a presidential veto.”57 This, combined with the fact that Congress has only sixty
legislative days after receiving a promulgated regulation to block it from
taking force,58 has ensured the CRA is used only after the rare Presidential
transitions when “a President from one of the major parties is [immediately] succeeded by a President from the other major party, and the new
President’s party also controls both Houses of Congress.”59
II.

WHY THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT SHOULD BE REPEALED

Although some environmentalists have hoped to use the CRA to
achieve their policy objectives,60 intensifying the tug-of-war over regulations during Presidential transitions only further erodes the ability to
govern. Instead, time, resources, political capital, and floor time in Congress
should be used on the legislative process to pass bipartisan environmental
laws and restore the administrative authority limited by the prior uses
of the CRA. Environmentalists should also lobby administrative agencies
to strategically implement other sensible environmental regulations. If
done politically astutely, repealing the CRA could be seen as not harming
the interests of either environmentalists or business interests.
The following arguments support this course of action. First, because the language in the CRA is so vague about: (1) what “substantially
similar” rules are;61 and (2) the parameters of judicial review of the
55
Steven M. Siros, CRA Survives Constitutional Challenge—Are More Rules and Guidance
at Risk of Disapproval?, JENNER & BLOCK LLP (2018), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=621fd4ed-c4be-481d-be0f-2c3bd4d011c6 [https://perma.cc/VM2C-RP6Y].
56
See Daniel A. Farber et al., Reforming “Regulatory Reform”: A Progressive Framework
for Agency Rulemaking in the Public Interest,” AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Oct. 2018), https://www
.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Oct-2018-APA-Farber-Heinzerling-Shane-issue
-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP7H-HXUT].
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Jean Chemnick, How a Biden Administration Could Reverse Trump’s Climate
Legacy, SCI. AM. (July 21, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-a-biden
-administration-could-reverse-trumps-climate-legacy/ [https://perma.cc/4K7J-62TG].
61
See § 801(b)(2).
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CRA,62 continuing to use the CRA could have unintended judicial consequences.63 The potential time, resources, and legal administrative authority
lost on additional litigation would only erect new barriers to addressing
climate change. Other, more effective methods such as the traditional
rule-making process and cooperative litigation, should be considered instead.64 Next, by allowing Congress to continue to veto rules, the CRA
creates additional uncertainty for stakeholders, including both environmentalists and corporate interests, while simultaneously injecting additional politics into the already controversial and complicated rule-making
process.65 This will make it even more difficult for any administration to
create long-term impactful policies to address climate issues. Finally, the
CRA has the potential to artificially stymie future bipartisan landmark
environmental legislation because its practical use is usually soon after
a new President takes office.66 This requires new Presidents to use political capital that could be used toward passing legislation during these
critical periods.67
A.

The CRA’s Ambiguity and Unintended Environmental
Consequences Make It a Dangerous Vehicle for
Environmentalists—the Administrative Procedures Act,
Executive Power, and Cooperative Litigation Are Better Options

Because the CRA has not faced substantial judicial scrutiny yet,68
there are no definitive ways of interpreting its ambiguous language.69 If the
CRA is not repealed or amended, such interpretations have the potential
to shape environmental regulations in ways not currently understood.70
Environmentalists should be worried that the CRA’s use, potentially including its use in ways initially perceived to be in the interests of environmentalists, could be turned on its head based on adverse judicial
62

See § 805.
See Chen, supra note 5, at 1; see also Douglas, supra note 5, at 299.
64
Milman, supra note 7; see, e.g., Lisa Friedman & John Schwartz, Election and Supreme
Court Fight Will Decide Trump’s Environmental Legacy, N.Y.TIMES (Sept. 25, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/23/climate/trump-environment-courts.html [https://perma.cc
/Y4Q9-YLRZ].
65
See Noll & Revesz (2019), supra note 8, at 72.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text.
69
Chen, supra note 5, at 1.
70
Id.
63
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rulings.71 For instance, if Democrats use the CRA to repeal a rollback of
an offshore drilling regulation, does that also block any future “substantially the same” regulations designed to limit offshore drilling? These
issues have the potential not only to backfire on environmentalists, but
related litigation would consume resources better served elsewhere. As
one commentator put it, although the CRA “can offer [Democrats] a few
‘wins’ in the short term, the CRA . . . will produce a lot more losses over
the long run.”72
Moreover, as time ticks on humanity’s ability to address climate
change,73 the ability to maximize all of an environmentalist President’s
time to govern will be of the essence. If the CRA is mired in litigation, what
happens to similar regulations in the pipeline as litigation moves forward?
Would the government be able to at least start the time-consuming rulemaking process74 while suits are resolved? There is no clear answer, although it might depend upon the discretion of the litigation strategy and
particular judges. But gambling with the precious time remaining to fight
climate change supports neither good governance nor environmental politics. As United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, “time
is fast running out for us to avert the worst impacts of climate disruption
and protect our societies from the inevitable impacts to come.”75
Instead of dealing with the nuances of the CRA, environmentalists and their allies should focus their regulatory ambitions on the
traditional rule-making process and cooperative litigation. There are
numerous opportunities.76 For instance, as some have pointed out, the
71

See Sam Batkins, Congress Strikes Back: The Institutionalization of the Congressional
Review Act, 45 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 351, 390 (2019).
72
James Goodwin, The Congressional Review Act Could be Put to Positive Short-Term Use,
But It Should Still Be Repealed, CTR. PROGRESSIVE REFORM (Aug. 20, 2020), http://pro
gressivereform.org/cpr-blog/congressional-review-act-could-be-put-positive-short-term-use
-it-should-still-be-repealed/ [https://perma.cc/Y99F-888N].
73
Denise Chow, ‘Time Is Fast Running Out’: World Meteorological Organization Warns
Climate Efforts Are Falling Short, NBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2020, 4:31 PM), https://www.nbc
news.com/science/science-news/time-fast-running-out-world-meteorological-organization
-warns-climate-efforts-n1154701 [https://perma.cc/T9ME-MHVD].
74
See generally CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41546, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2017).
75
Chow, supra note 73.
76
Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 64; Rebecca Leber, The Quickest Way to Undo
Trump’s Environmental Mess Isn’t as Easy as You’d Think, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 8, 2021),
https://www.motherjones.com/environment/2021/01/the-quickest-way-to-undo-trumps-en
vironmental-mess-isnt-as-easy-as-youd-think/ [https://perma.cc/G2T7-F6MD]. See, e.g.,
Milman, supra note 7.
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Trump administration was sloppy in drafting and codifying many regulations.77 As environmentalists have brought suits against Trump rules,
their track record of delaying or blocking the rules has been impressive.78
For instance, as of late September 2020, “the Environmental Protection
Agency [had] won only nine out of 47 cases in court under Mr. Trump,
while the Interior Department [had] won four of 22.”79 And the environmentalists’ success in court might only increase in a friendly administration eager to settle lawsuits from their allies to accommodate their shared
policy goals.80
Some worry that the Trump administration’s footprint on the federal judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, might temper this success.81
However, as California’s former Democratic attorney general (and President Biden’s new Secretary of Health and Human Services) put it, environmentalists are bolstered by “[t]he facts, the science and the law.”82 This
has borne out to some degree in the early days of the Biden administration.83 Indeed, days after President Biden took office a three-judge panel
at the D.C. Circuit struck down a Trump rule that would have “abolished
rules that loosened the EPA’s implementation of ozone standards under
the Clean Air Act.”84 Additional victories are likely, especially as President
Biden works to appoint other judges to appellate courts.85
Moreover, because President Trump used executive orders and
Presidential memorandums instead of codifying regulations to implement
much of his agenda,86 President Biden can reverse many of those policies
with the stroke of a pen.87 Indeed, in his first sixteen days in office,

77

Id.
Id.
79
Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 64.
80
See Chemnick, supra note 60.
81
Friedman & Schwartz, supra note 64.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Anya van Wagtendonk, Trump’s Environmental Legacy Suffers Two Major Court
Losses, VOX (Jan. 30, 2021, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2021/1/30/22258030/trump-envi
ronmental-legacy-epa-court-losses-ozone-secret-science [https://perma.cc/TA7L-F87W].
84
Id.
85
See Jacqueline Thomsen, How Trump Judges Are Poised to Shape Biden’s First Legal
Challenges, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 18, 2021, 4:45 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal
/2021/03/18/how-trump-judges-are-poised-to-shape-bidens-first-legal-challenges
/?slreturn=20210220225233 [https://perma.cc/R4UN-7WFR].
86
See Ashlyn Still & Adrian Blanco, A Visual Breakdown of Biden’s Barrage of Executive
Actions in his First Weeks, WASH.POST (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/po
litics/interactive/2021/biden-executive-orders-breakdown/ [https://perma.cc/U3RJ-VNBZ].
87
Id.
78
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President Biden signed sixteen executive orders and Presidential memorandums “revok[ing] one or more Trump policies.”88 Additionally, in President Biden’s second week in office, a federal judge in Montana held that
the Trump administration improperly tried to sidestep the provisions in
the APA to implement the so-called “Secret Science Rule” which would
have “limited the [scientific] research some federal employees [could] use
when conducting their work.”89 Because the Trump administration did
not implement the rule correctly, the court gave President Biden authority to properly use his executive power to change or eliminate the rule.90
While the tools above rely on judicial approval or assume that the
environmentalist President’s predecessor was sloppy in using his executive
power, there are other ways the new President can quickly block (or at least
amend) regulations his predecessor tried to push through at the end of
his term.91 For instance, subject to legal limitations, Biden administration officials can “declin[e] to pursue or withdraw[] agency enforcement
actions” initiated under President Trump.92 This is common during Presidential transitions, and other environmental Presidents will have it at
their disposal.93
In addition, as is traditional,94 on his first day in office President
Biden signed a “regulatory freeze” memorandum that:
ensure[s] that [his] appointees or designees have an opportunity to review any new or pending rules . . . Pursuant to
the memo, rules that have been sent to the Office of the
Federal Register but that have not yet been published
must not be published until a department or agency head
appointed or designated by the new administration reviews
88

Id.
Eric Katz, Judge Gives Biden Path to Quickly Repeal Trump’s ‘Secret Science’ Rule, GOV’T
EXEC. (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.govexec.com/management/2021/01/judge-gives-biden
-path-quickly-repeal-trumps-secret-science-rule/171709/ [https://perma.cc/YR24-T7S5].
90
Id.
91
See, e.g., Tad Heuer et al., Five Ways the Biden Administration Could Rescind or Reverse
the Trump Administration’s Regulatory Actions, FOLEY HOAG (Nov. 13, 2020), https://foley
hoag.com/-/media/files/foley%20hoag/publications/white%20papers/five%20ways%20the%
20biden%20administration%20could%20rescind%20or%20reverse%20the%20trump%20
administrations%20regulatory%20actions.ashx [https://perma.cc/DWU5-3BGF].
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
John S. Marten et al., Biden Administration Issues “Regulatory Freeze” Memo, NAT’L
L. REV. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/biden-administration-issues
-regulatory-freeze-memo#:~:text=On%20January%2020%2C%202021%2C%20the,pend
ing%20rules%20(the%20Memo) [https://perma.cc/33BA-CBJE].
89
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and approves the rule. In addition, the memo directs department and agency heads to consider postponing rules
that have been published in the Federal Register but that
have not yet taken effect to seek additional public comment
on issues of fact, law and policy raised by the rules and
thereafter to take appropriate action.95
While it is not yet clear how many regulations this memorandum influenced, it certainly has the potential to affect almost all aspects of American life.96
The downsides of the CRA and the power of regulatory tools
described above might help to explain why during their window in 2021,
President Biden and his Democratic majorities in Congress only repealed
three regulations using the CRA (including only one environmental regulation).97 This relatively small number was a significant surprise for many
observers given that there were numerous rules that theoretically could
have been repealed using the CRA,98 including forty-eight at the Environmental Protection Agency and thirty-one at the Department of Interior.99
B.

The CRA Could Create Uncertainty for Stakeholders and Make
It More Difficult to Craft Long-Term Environmental Regulations

The CRA’s ambiguity, along with the fact that the CRA allows the
political branches to easily scrap recently promulgated regulations, creates
95

Id.
Id.
97
Frazin, supra note 3.
98
See, e.g., Sheila McCafferty Harvey et al., The Return of the Congressional Review Act,
PILLSBURY (Jan. 19, 2021), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/congres
sional-review-act-cra-biden.html [https://perma.cc/8UVR-GNTA]; Katelynn Bradley et
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uncertainty for stakeholders while making it more difficult for administrations to craft long-term policies to address contentious climate issues.100
The uncertainties of the CRA should concern Democrats and environmentalists. Those who want to address climate change should not support a
weakened administrative state.101 Its expertise and speed (relative to
Congress) is essential to adapt the environmental regulatory framework
to meet the challenge.102 Business interests, meanwhile, often support
predictability. The CRA does not support that goal.103
The CRA has the potential to upend Presidential transitions and
inject more partisanship into the administrative state.104 This is because
federal agencies, especially when working to promulgate rules close to a
Presidential election or when there is divided government, must be cognizant that their work could be easily repealed with the CRA.105 Congressional input has always been a part of the rule-making process, but some
commentators believe that the threat of the CRA veto provides Congress
with too much leverage.106 Congress, with its hyper-partisanship and relatively few legislative sessions, simply injects another source of uncertainty into the regulatory process.107 Indeed, as the country ramps up its
efforts to reign in climate change,108 it will need an apolitical bureaucracy
to make decisions on policy and science, not political influences.109 This
regulatory work will almost certainly be controversial and complicated,110
dictating that policy experts be given the space needed to address the
complex issues and the rule-making process to ensure their work is
beyond reproach.111
100

See Davenport, supra note 98.
See Farber et al., supra note 56; Goodwin, supra note 72. But see also David Schoenbrod,
Consent of the Governed: A Constitutional Norm That the Court Should Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 244 (2020).
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Noll & Revesz (2020), supra note 8.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Dude, supra note 24, at 122–23; THOMAS O. MCGARITY ET AL., CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: THE CASE FOR REPEAL 1 (2018).
108
Dude, supra note 24, at 122–23; MCGARITY ET AL., supra note 107, at 1.
109
Dude, supra note 24, at 122–23; MCGARITY ET AL., supra note 107, at 1.
110
See Kathy Wagner Hill, The State of the Administrative State: The Regulatory Impact
of the Trump Administration, 6 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 25,
31–32 (2019).
111
See Elaine Kamarck, The Challenging Politics of Climate Change, BROOKINGS (Sept. 23,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-of-climate-change/
[https://perma.cc/MP9F-ETTN].
101

278

WM. & MARY ENV’T L. & POL’Y REV.

[Vol. 46:265

Business interests, meanwhile, have incentives to support repealing the CRA.112 Business interests that support weakening the administrative state could have their efforts to eliminate regulations unwound
using the CRA.113 Additionally, research shows that the disapproval resolutions signed by President Trump were “haphazard at best, having little
to do with the burdens created by individual regulations.”114 Indeed, there
was no “apparent connection between cost and the outcome of the congressional review process.”115 This is not entirely surprising. As one commentator put it, “[t]he CRA is best understood as a legislative gimmick, as
its real power comes from greasing the procedural skids so that attacks on
commonsense protections can become law in a matter of just days or
weeks with scant consideration or substantive debate, and almost no public
scrutiny.”116 While it is difficult to know conclusively how the Republicans decided to use the CRA in 2017, it seems likely that their behavior
was largely political. Regardless, their actions did little to provide the
strategic deregulation that business interests might have expected.
Moreover, the CRA could make it difficult for effected businesses
to predict which administrative regulatory scheme they will need to follow.117 Indeed, under the APA, federal agencies usually must accept formal
input from stakeholders and weigh the potential costs of new rules.118
Business interests are therefore entitled to provide their perspectives on
rules and are given ample notice on how the regulatory regime might
change.119 Stakeholders are not guaranteed such input when Congress
112
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uses the CRA.120 And even if they do lobby Congress, they would need to
secure a majority of Members to block the CRA’s use, a tall task.121 This
inserts even more uncertainty for stakeholders, affecting their compliance
regimes which can be quite costly.122
This is not to say that it will be easy to get entrenched business
interests—who are often reflectively opposed to the administrative state
and see the CRA as a way to influence government when their preferred
candidates win office—to stand idly by as the CRA is repealed,123 especially
after the perceived success they enjoyed during the Trump administration.124 These interests might be more amenable if their own priorities
are repealed under the CRA.125 Regardless, it will be up to stakeholders
doing the difficult work of coming together and governing to make their
interests align.
C.

The CRA Has the Potential to Artificially Stymie Future
Bipartisan Landmark Environmental Legislation

The CRA warps the political landscape and political calculus at
the beginning of Presidential terms,126 something which has a chance of
obstructing bipartisan environmental legislation. Although federal agencies
have expansive regulatory authority, generally they can only add, remove,
or amend regulations through the arduous process set forth by the APA.127
This process is time-consuming, expensive, and complicated.128 Because
a Presidential term is only four years, Presidents have an incentive to
start the APA process as early as possible to ensure regulations are codified by the end of the term.129 Otherwise, the next President could simply
halt the rule-making process, thwarting his predecessor’s efforts with the
stroke of a pen.130
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However, the President must weight his regulatory agenda with
his legislative agenda. Generally, a President’s political and legislative
power is at its apex at the beginning of his administration.131 It is usually
during that time the President is in the best position to pass the most
consequential, and potentially bipartisan, legislation.132 If that legislation
is codified in federal law, the next President cannot substantially change
the law without going to Congress.133 However, by using the regulatory
process to circumvent the legislative process to achieve policy goals early
in his administration, especially when the rule addresses controversial
issues, the President risks alienating stakeholders and lawmakers whose
support is necessary to pass bipartisan legislation.134
President Biden faced criticism from such actors as he used executive orders early in his administration.135 In response, President Biden
felt the need to make it clear that he is “not making new law. [He’s] eliminating [President Trump’s] bad policy.”136 If Democrats had compounded
on these concerns by using precious floor time in Congress debating the
use of numerous CRA disapproval resolutions, they would have reduced
the amount of time Congress used to craft other legislation,137 something
likely to have a longer legacy than any regulation.138
While the new President is already in a difficult position in determining how to approach the process at the beginning of his term,139 the
CRA has the potential to tip the scales.140 In addition to the concerns listed
above, the President must also worry that his successor will use the CRA
131
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to repeal regulations promulgated later in his term, giving him the incentive to start the rule-making process as early in his term as possible to
ensure he is in a position to veto the CRA.141 This time frame could alienate
stakeholders at the same time a President has the greatest chance of passing important bipartisan environmental legislation.142 By the same token,
if the new President is able to use the CRA to repeal regulations promulgated toward the end of the prior administration, his actions are also
likely to alienate stakeholders and lawmakers who supported that rule,
making legislation even more difficult.143 As one commentator put it the,
nakedly partisan exercise as passage of a CRA resolution of
disapproval risks weakening Congress further by reinforcing
its paralyzing state of dysfunction. With each resolution
that is adopted, the mutual animosity and distrust between
the two parties risks growing ever greater, incrementally
broadening the existing partisan gap and putting future
efforts at reaching across the aisle on bipartisan compromise just a little further out of reach.144
Unfortunately, under the status quo and the polarization and gridlock in
Congress, and the President’s incentives to use the CRA and rule-making
process as early in his administration as possible, he is likely to be inclined to take the low hanging fruit and start regulating immediately.145
While this serves the President’s short-term policy goals, it does not create
the type of long-standing and permanent laws necessary to address our
pressing environmental concerns.146 Instead, the regulatory landscape
affecting climate change will continue in the current push and pull cycle
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between pro-business and pro-environment administrations, wasting resources, and precious time.
CONCLUSION
The CRA is harmful to environmental good governance and should
be repealed for three main reasons. First, central provisions in the CRA
are ambiguous147 and the CRA’s future use could cause negative unintended consequences on the environment.148 Environmentalists have better
methods available to achieve their regulatory goals.149 Next, the CRA
creates uncertainty for both environmentalists and corporate interests,
while at the same time making it difficult for any administration to create
long-term impactful policies to address controversial climate issues.150
Finally, the CRA has the potential to artificially stymie future legislation, specifically impairing support for environmental bills.151 In the end,
repealing the CRA has an unusual potential in Washington right now:
improve environmental governance without angering partisans and business interests.152
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